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STUDENT NOTE
ADMISSIBILITY OF RESULTS OF COMPULSORY BLOOD TESTS
To DETERMINE INTOXICATION
In a recent decision the United States Supreme Court held
that extraction of blood samples from a drunk-driving suspect while
he is unconscious in order to determine the extent of the suspect's
inebriation, if any, is not "such a method of obtaining evidence
that it offends a sense of justice," and does not, therefore, violate
the suspect's constitutional right to due process guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.1
The court also held inapplicable the right to freedom from self-
incrimination as guaranteed by the fifth amendment 2 and the right
to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by
the fourth amendment.3 The problem involved is one of tre-
mendous practical importance in today's age of high speed,
motorized slaughter on the highways.4
Throughout the United States there is a growing use and
dependence upon chemical tests to determine intoxication in cases
1 Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4 For enlightening and astonishing facts see NATONAL SArETY CouNcH.,
AccIENr FAcTs 43-71 (1956).
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of motorists suspected of being under the influence of alcohol 5
Chemical tests now used for such purpose include the examina-
tion of the blood, urine, breath or saliva of the suspect. By meas-
uring the amount of alcohol in these bodily substances an accurate
and reliable estimate of the concentration of alcohol in the cir-
culating blood can be obtained. The amount of concentration
which will impair the ability of a motorist has also been deter-
mined.6 However, there is some conflict of authority and a great
deal of literature on the subject of the admissibility of such evi-
dence in a criminal trial against the accused.7 Zealous defense
attorneys are constantly objecting to the admission of such evi-
dence on the grounds that it is violative of the defendant's con-
stitutional rights.
Due Process
The defense of violation of the constitutional guarantee of
due process of law was a novel one in the field of blood tests to
determine intoxication when the Supreme Court considered it
recently.8 What evidently gave the defense the incentive to crave
certiorari by the Supreme Court was the result of Rochin V.
California,9 wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant's
right to due process had been violated. However, as pointed out
by the Court, the decision in the Rochin case was based on the
fact that the entire conduct of the officers from beginning to end
was "brutal" and "shocking",10 whereas there is nothing "brutal"
or "shocldng" about the extraction of a sample of blood from an
unconscious -person under the direct supervision of a physician."
When coercion, force or brutality is used against the accused, his
right to due process is undoubtedly violated;' 2 but these elements
are generally lacdng in the normal course of the performance of
a blood test.
GSee 1955 Uses of Chemical Tests for Intoxication, REPORT OF Tm Com-
MITrEE ON TESTS FOR INTOXICATION OF THE NATIONAL SAFETY CouNciL.
0 See 25 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 86, 41 (1956); 1 GRAY, ATTom, E's
TEXTooK OF MEDICINE 619 (1949).
7 For general discussion and collection of cases see 58 Am. JuR. Witnesses
§§ 40, 67 (1948); Annot., 164 A.L.R. 967 (1946); Annot., 88 A.L.R. 848
(1934).
5 Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
9 842 U.S. 165 (1952).
1029 RocKY MT. L. REv. 430 (1957).
1128 id. at 69 (1955).
12 lochin v. California, 842 U.S. 165 (1952).
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It is well settled that the provisions of the first eight amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution do not apply to state courts.'8
Also, the fourteenth amendment, which does apply to states,
is not inclusive of the provisions of the first eight, but is a separate
and distinct prohibition, consisting of separate elements.' 4 There-
fore, the state courts are not bound by the Constitution of the
United States to the federal rule, as announced in the Weeks
case,'5 that evidence obtained in violation of rights protected by
the fourth and fifth amendments is inadmissible in a criminal case.
Although most of the states reject the reasoning behind the fed-
eral rule 6 and admit evidence in a criminal case without inquir-
ing into the legality of its collection,1'7 a number of states,' includ-
ing West Virginia,'9 follow the federal rule announced in the
13 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25 (1949); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319 (1937); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
14 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Palko v. Connecticut, 802 U.S.
819 (1937). Also, see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908).
'
5 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
16 "If [articles] can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914).
17 Barker v. Warden, 208 Md. 662, 119 A.2d 710 (1956); Morales v.
State, 38 Ala. App. 400, 85 So. 2d 153 (1956); Commonwealth v. Tunstall,
178 Pa. Super. 859, 115 A.2d 914 (1955); Akron v. Stouffis, 96 Ohio App.
105, 121 N.E.2d 307 (1953); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 581, 543 (1956).
IS Parrott v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1956); State v.
Cyr, 40 Wn.2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952); State v. Gibbs, 252 Wis. 227,
31 N.W.2d 143 (1948); Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 556 (1956).
19 State v. Lacy, 118 W. Va. 343, 190 S.E. 344 (1937); State v. Andrews,
91 W. Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257 (1922). Before the decision in Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), West Virginia apparently followed the
majority view in admitting evidence whether unlawfully obtained or not.
See State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 373, 76 S.E. 811 (1912); State v.
Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 229, 41 S.E. 429, 432 (1902). However, the
Andrews case, supra, coming after the Weeks case, changed the West Virginia
law, without expressly disapproving the dictum in the prior cases, to con-
form to the federal rule. The rationale for this decision was that since W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 6, relating to search and seizure is substantially the same
as the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and since the last
clause of W. VA. CONsT. art. IHI, § 5, protecting one in a criminal case
from being compelled to be a witness agaist himself, is substantially the
same as the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, the provisions
of our constitution should receive harmonious construction when applied to
the actions of state officers.
20Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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Weeks case,20 and refuse to admit evidence which has been un-
lawfully obtained.21
Self-Incrimination
The defense of the constitutional provision2 2 against being
compelled to be a witness against oneself is the one most fre-
quently relied on by persons complaining that their constitutional
rights have been invaded by use against them in criminal court
of evidence secured by a compulsory physical examination or
other invasion of their bodily integrity.2 3 In recent cases in the
state courts, however, the contention has met with very little
favor. The better view and the one generally used by the courts
is that the privilege applies solely to testimonial compulsions. 24
Mr. Justice Holmes, in Holt v. United States,25 said,
"But the prohibition of compelling a man in criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it
may be material."
Professor Wigmore is of a like opinion:
"Looking back at the history of the privilege and the spirit
of the struggle by which its establishment came about, the
object of the protection seems plain. It is the employ-
ment of legal process to extract from the person's own lips
an admission of his guilt, which will thus take the place of
other evidence."26
Although many courts have confused the problem of whether
illegally obtained evidence is admissible and whether the com-
pulsory blood test is illegally obtained evidence,2 7 the better view
21 The exclusionary rule of the federal courts which is followed in West
Virginia, although it is the minority view, seems to be the better and
more enlightened rule. For an excellent discussion of the two American
views, see 1955 Cum. L. REv. 339, 345 (1955).
22 U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
23 Arnot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952); Annot., 164 A.L.R. 969 (1946).
24 State v. Cram, 176 Ore. 577, 160 P.2d 283, 164 A.L.R. 952 (1945).
Contra, Apocada v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 593, 146 S.W.2d 381 (1940).
INBAU, SELF-INcaRnNAnioN (1950); 32 Cm-KENT L. REv. 250 (1954);
Annot., 164 A.L.R. 967 (1946).
25218 U.S. 245, 252 (1910).
268 WIGMORE, EviDENcE 362, 363 (1940).
2TSee People v. One 1941 Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. 199, 203, 168
P.2d 448, 446 (1946).
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is that the introduction of such evidence does not violate the ac-
cused's privilege against self-incrimination. 28
"On numerous occasions courts have held that the privilege
was not designed to afford protection from compulsory physical
examination conducted for the purpose of identity or for ascer-
taining facts of a physical nature indicative of the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused."29 Many types of examinations have been
required and admitted by courts as competent evidence.8 0
Unlawful Search and Seizure
In the case of compulsory blood tests the defense of unlaw-
ful search and seizure is untenable, also, even in states, like West
Virginia, which follow the federal rule of exclusion.3' This con-
stitutional provision is designed to protect citizens from having
their homes invaded at will without legal warrants and from
indiscriminate searches of the persons themselves and is directed
against only unreasonable searches and seizures.32 "It cannot be
extended so far from its original purpose."33
2 8Block v. People, 240 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1951); State v. Sturtevant, 90
N.H. 99, 70 A.2d 909 (1950); People v. Tucker, 88 Cal. App. 2d 333, 198
P.2d 941 (1948).
2960Kr.. L. -lEv. 194, 195 (1953).
30 Smith v. United States, 187 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 927 (1951) (comrpelling defendant to dye his hair); Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) (compelling defendant to wear certain clothes);
State v. Johnson, 111 W. Va. 653, 164 S.E. 31 (1932) (taking fingerprints
under compulsion); State V. Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544, 128 S.E. 580 (1924)
(admission of compulsory physical examination, including X-ray); People
v. Clark, 18 Cal. 2d 449, 116 P.2d 56 (1941) (compelling defendant to stand
during trial for better identification); Biggs v. State, 201 Ind. 200, 167 N.E.
129 (1929) (taking shoes to compare with footprints); State v. Oschoa,
49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926) (examination of defendant for identifying
scars, marks, or wounds); Johnson v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 291, 238 S.W.
983 (1922) (placing foot into disputed prints for comparison). But cf., Allen
v. State, 183 Md. 608, 39 A.2d 820 (1944) (where prosecution overstepped the
limit).
s1 INBAU, SELr-INcBmnNATIoN 72-86; 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LDn=ATIONS 610 (1927).
32 Cf. State v. Weltha, 228 Iowa 519, 292 N.W. 148 (1940). Contra,
United States v. Willis, 85 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Cal. 1949). See 32 Cm-KENT
L. REv. 250, 254 (1954): "As this protection deals with things which an
individual might possess in the privacy of his home rather than with prohibi-
tion of his personal make-up or physical condition, a blood test or other
physical examination of his person would not come within the privilege." For
annotations on this point see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1407 (1952), 159 A.L.R.
209 (1945), 127 A.L.R. 1513 (1940), 82 A.L.R. 782 (1983), 74 A.L.R. 1384(1931). Cf. Bachelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and
Seizure, 41 J. Cnin. L. & ClUMnNOLOGY 189 (1950).
36 OxLA. L. REv. 194, 196 (1953).
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"If in English history we inquire into the original occasion
for these constitutional provisions, we shall probably find
it in the abuse of executive authority, and in the unwar-
rantable intrusion of executive agents into the houses and
among the private papers of individuals, in order to obtain
evidence of political offenses either committed or de-
signed."34
Indeed, the question is almost purely academic anyway.35
The vast majority of states holds that unlawful search and seizure
do not render inadmissible any evidence obtained thereby if other-
wise material.30 Although the federal rule, which is followed by a
minority of the states, including West Virginia,3 7 is otherwise,38
even in these minority jurisdictions a person under lawful arrest
may be searched and any incriminating evidence thus found and
seized is admissible.30 The question becomes important where the
law enforcement officer is dealing with an unconscious person,40
but even here the better view is that the chemical tests are out-
side the scope of this protection.41
"The provision against unlawful search and seizure was
designed to serve as a security to persons in their posses-
sions and effects, to protect the individual from having his
home invaded at will without proper warrant issued upon
justifiable grounds, and to protect the individual from being
searched personally for his possessions without reason or
suspicion. This protection deals with things which an indi-
vidual might possess and the privacy of his home rather
than prohibiting a disclosure of his personal makeup or
physical condition after he has been properly arrested. A
34 1 COOLEY, CONSTrrUnONAL LnmTATioNs 612.
35 23 BROOKLYN L. REv. 257 (1957).
36State v. Dillon, 34 N.M. 366, 281 Pac. 474, 88 A.L.R. 340 (1929);
People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); see Wolf v. Colorado,
388 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 58 (1947);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908); 23 BROoKLyx L. Rlv. 257(1957); 1955 Cmnm. L. REa. 339 (1955).
3 T State v. Lacy, 118 W. Va. 848, 190 S.E. 844 (1937); State v.
Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 114 S.E. 257 (1922). But see State v. Sutter, 71
W. Va. 371, 873, 76 S.E. 811 (1912); State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 229,
41 S.E. 429,482 (1902).
38 See Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S. 25, 29 (1949).
39 State v. Hatfield, 112 W. Va. 424, 164 S.E. 518 (1932); State v. Brown,
101 W. Va. 160, 132 S.E. 366 (1926); State v. Rudy, 98 W. Va. 444, 127
S.E. 190 (1925); Aired v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. 1954); Wil-
liamson v. State, 194 Tenn. 341, 250 S.W.2d 556 (1952); Arthur v. State,
227 Ind. 493, 86 N.E.2d 698 (1949).
4023 BROOKLYN L. 1Ev. 257, 260 (1957).
41But of., Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 683, 16 A.2d 80 (1940).
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blood test or physical examination of a person solely to
determine his physical condition does not come into the
range of the constitutional restraint upon unlawful search
and seizure."42
Physician-Patient Privilege
The physician-patient privilege from confidential disclosures
extends to physical observations made by the physician, its pur-
pose being to enable the doctor to administer treatment more intel-
ligently by a full knowledge of all the pertinent facts. 43 Although
this privilege should not, logically, apply when the doctor is em-
ployed for the sole purpose of obtaining a blood sample,44 in view
of a court decision in a comparable situation,45 it would seem wise
for the prosecutor operating in a jurisdiction where the privilege
exists to employ a doctor who has had no hand in the treatment
of the accused to perform the blood extraction and tests.40 How-
ever, the privilege does not exist at common law47 so is generally
considered not in existence in the absence of a statute providing
for it. 48 In West Virginia, although by statute the privilege exists
in justice of the peace courts, 4 9 there is no statute providing for
it in courts of record,50 and presumably, therefore, does not exist
there.
Conclusion
As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Clark in Breithaupt v. Abram0'
and as confirmed by the National Safety Council:5 2
"Modem community living requires modem scientific meth-
42 Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of the Blood Test To
Determine Intoxication, 24 IowA L. REv. 191, 216-217 (1939).
43 28 R.C.L. 536 (1921).
44 6 OKLA. L. REv. 194, 197 (1953).
45 Clapp v. State, 73 Okla. Crim. 261, 120 P.2d 381 (1941). Opinion
testimony of doctor who treated defendant to the effect that the defendant
was intoxicated at the time of the accident was excluded.
46 6 OQELA. L. Rxv. 194, 197-198 (1953).
4 7 Curd, Privileged Communications Between the Doctor and His Patient
-An Anomaly of the Law, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 165, 166 (1938).
48 See Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va. 253, 256, 193 S.E. 121, 122 (1937).
49 W. VA. CODE c. 50, art. 6, § 10e (Michie 1955).
50 See Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va. 253, 256, 193 S.E. 121, 122 (1937).
However, as brought out by Judge Curd in his article, 44 W. VA. L.Q. 165,
there seems to be widespread belief, or did at the time of the article, in both
the medical and legal professions in West Virginia that such a privilege does
exist. This belief is, it seems, wholly unfounded.
5177 Sup. Ct. 408, 412 (1957).
52 NAnoNAL SAF-'rY CouNcm, AcciDNer FAcTs 43-71 (1956).
7
H.: Admissibility of Results of Compulsory Blood Tests to Determine I
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1957
STUDENT NOTE
ods of crime detection lest the public go unprotected. The
increasing slaughter on our highways, most of which should
be avoidable, now reaches the astounding figures only
heard of on the battlefield. As against the right of an indi-
dividual that his rights be held inviolable, even against so
slight an intrusion as is involved in applying a blood test of
a kind to which millions of Americans submit as a matter
of course nearly every day, must be set the interests of so-
ciety in the scientific determination of intoxication, one of
the great causes of the mortal hazards of the road. And
the more so since the test likewise may establish innocence,
thus affording protection against the treachery of judg-
ment based on one or more of the senses."
In view of the foregoing discussion, it seems an inescapable
conclusion that the West Virginia court would uphold the com-
petency and admissibility of evidence obtained by a compulsory
blood test made from blood taken from an unconscious suspect in a
criminal case.53 Without the benefit of the compulsory blood test,
it must be conceded that methods for coping with the situation are
grossly inadequate. If the driver is highly intoxicated, the methods
commonly used, such as observation of facial color, odor of breath,
condition of eyes, speech, ability to walk a straight line, etc., may
suffice. However, it is not the highly intoxicated person who is
the most dangerous normally, because that type does not often
drive. The danger is caused by the moderately intoxicated person.
There is a statute recently enacted in West Virginia which
authorizes the taking of blood samples and the introduction of
evidence relating thereto for the purpose of determining intoxica-
tion.5 4 This law should be greatly beneficial to West Virginia. The
constitutional privileges are not applicable to such evidence, for the
reasons set out above. However, "courts are reluctant to proceed
upon such a question without legislative approval, fearing that they
may be accused of judicial legislation."55 The recent act precludes
53 But see State v. Coleman, 96 W. Va. 544, 549, 123 S.E. 580, 582(1924), where the court says, "Ordinarily the result of a physical examination
made without the consent of the accused is not admissible in evidence, but
we find the weight of authority in this country is to the effect that where the
defense of insanity is made, evidence of the facts disclosed by physical and
mental examination of the accused by physicians either prior to or during
the trial, with or without his consent, does not violate the constitutional
privilege of the accused not to be a witness against himself." The first clause
of the above quotation is dictum and wholly without support in the opinion.
54W. VA. CODE C. 17C, art. 5, § 2a (Michie Supp. 1957). Also, under
recent legislation, compulsory blood-grouping tests in a paternity case are
authorized. Id. c. 48, art 7, § 8.
55 6 OxLA. L. REv. 194,208 (1953).
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this reluctance and, as a consequence, lends potency to the statute
prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles upon the state high.
ways while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.50
Chemical tests, if conducted properly and carefully, now afford
a safe and accurate basis for determining intoxication." The courts
and protective authorities need the benefits of these tests to aid
them in the struggle to make our highways safe and in the just
determination of cases.
G. W. H., Jr.
56W. VA. CODE c. 17C, art. 5, § 2 (Michie Supp. 1957).
57 For a discussion of the reliability of chemical tests for intoxication see
25 U. KAN. L. Rev. 36, 41-50 (1956).
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